FOR YEARS the argument about Britain’s energy policy has been an argument about a number: what it costs. This week the government gave its answer. It didn’t cut the cost; it rearranged where the cost appears. In seven days it published a scheme to route industrial relief around the household bill, a discount that spreads the price of new pylons across every bill in the country, and carbon limits that forbid the adequacy fleet to do the thing it is paid to do. A minister supplied the summary. The cost, she says, is ‘misinformation’.

Start with the pair that frames the week. On Wednesday DESNZ opened a consultation on the legislative plumbing for the British Industrial Competitiveness Scheme: from April 2027 some 10,000 manufacturers will be exempted from the indirect costs of the Renewables Obligation, the Feed-in Tariff and the Capacity Market — about £35–40 off each megawatt-hour, up to a quarter off their bills, worth up to £600m a year. It’s worth reading the mechanism. Exchequer funding is to be ‘channelled through the CfD supplier obligation’ so the relief doesn’t increase ‘electricity bills for households and other non-exempt consumers’. The relief on offer is relief from paying for low-carbon generation; the working assumption of the policy is that British industry can’t compete while carrying those levies. And the cost doesn’t disappear when it leaves the bill. It moves to the Exchequer i.e. from company energy bills to household tax bills.

Days earlier, the same department priced the view from the bedroom window. Households within 500 metres of new or upgraded transmission lines will receive £250 a year for ten years — £2,500, paid through their supplier, first payments in the first half of 2027, with 43 projects named in the initial list. Compensating people who live beside new infrastructure is fair enough, although the sum in this case is a fraction of the reduction in resale value. The telling part is where the money comes from: a small addition to everyone’s bill, reported at roughly 80p a year. The disamenity of the grid build-out is now priced, published and socialised — a real cost of the wires, admitted in cash, that never appears when the strike prices are compared.

From the other end of the system, the adequacy machine tied a knot in itself. DESNZ has republished its 84-page guidance on carbon limits in the Capacity Market: alongside a limit of 550 grams of CO₂ per unit generated sits a cap of 350 kilograms per installed kilowatt per year — a run-hours limit dressed as an emissions rule. The Capacity Market exists to pay firm plant to be available for the windless evening. The same contract now constrains how much that plant may run. We’re paying for readiness and capping the ready.

The week’s sharpest exchange was about whether any of this exists. On the Today programme at the start of the month the energy minister Miatta Fahnbulleh dismissed the claim that net-zero policy is raising bills as ‘misinformation’. This week David Turver opened the accounts. Electricity subsidies — ROCs, CfDs, feed-in tariffs, Sizewell C — have risen from £0.5bn in 2010/11 to £11.8bn last year; grid integration costs from £2.8bn to £8bn; together they reached £19.8bn a year and are forecast past £40bn by 2030/31, against a gas fuel bill of about £7bn. ‘Misinformation’ is a word that can be checked against the government’s own books. The books are not sceptic sources.

Jan Rosenow, a pro-transition lobbyist, published a comparison of heat-pump costs this week: German installations at €35,366, British at €12,095. Note what is being compared — two subsidised prices. The absolute price, and the grid cost of running the fleet on the coldest evening of the year, sit outside the frame, as they always do in his work. Its value is as a specimen of pseudo-academia — advocacy in academic clothing, the boundary drawn to keep the hard part out of the sum — not as an insight into what renewables cost.

Abroad, the week was franker. China’s new five-year plan for coal has the head of the National Energy Administration calling the fuel the country’s ‘greatest source of confidence’ in keeping the lights on; the plan commits only to coal consumption ‘successfully reaching a peak’, no year attached, while trimming the strategic reserve-production target from 300 million tonnes to 100. And Europe’s nuclear retreat is reversing. Javier Blas reports that Spain will run to 2030 reactors that were due to close next year, and that Hungary, Slovakia, France and Britain plan to expand their fleets. The firm, dispatchable power the renewables-only timetable says it has outgrown is being readmitted — by the governments doing the building, not the critics.

And for anyone consoled by the thought that the North Sea windfall levy at least raises money, the Telegraph’s arithmetic went the other way. The 78% levy is forcing fields to shut early, and early shutdown brings forward the decommissioning tax reliefs the Treasury must pay — about £13bn by 2035 on the North Sea Transition Authority’s figures. ‘Forcing fields to close prematurely does not simply switch off future tax receipts,’ notes Brian Gilvary, chairman of Ineos Energy and no one’s idea of a militant. A tax sold as taking money from a windfall now pays to close the fields, and the output returns as imported LNG.

The winter, meanwhile, is being priced now. John Kemp reports Europe’s gas stores less than three-fifths full — the lowest for the time of year on record, with the refill window closing — and Bloomberg put Tuesday’s day-ahead power print at £133 a megawatt-hour, the highest since June, in a summer heatwave, with gas still setting the price. Whatever the accounting says, the margin is decided upstream, months early, in molecules.

Seven days, one direction of travel: the cost of the plan is not being cut, and it’s barely being disputed. It’s being moved, spread and denied. The bill is not the cost.